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NOTES
MEDICAL TESTIMONY
AND THE HEARSAY RULE
Since personal injury litigation comprises a significant proportion of all
civil actions,2 and as a case involving injury or disease necessitates the
presentation of reliable medical evidence to the trier of fact, the use of
medical testimony has become increasingly important. It is especially sig-
nificant when determining damages because the amount of compensation
is generally dependent on the nature and duration of injuries. Inasmuch as
the usual source of this information is the medical witness,8 his testimony
must necessarily be presented to the jury in a manner which neither preju-
dices the defendant nor deprives the plaintiff of just compensation.' Present
rules of evidence, however, do not always achieve this result. Contemporary
application of the hearsay rule in some jurisdictions prevents the medical
witness from providing the jury with the data used by physicians for diag-
nosis and treatment.' This is particularly true with respect to the case
"history,"' which is the physician's most important diagnostic aid with
the possible exception of knowledge gained from his own examination.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the various situations in which the
1. Although disputes about the evidentiary rules applied to medical testimony arise
chiefly in personal injury cases, there are other actions in which the rules are also rele-
vant: claims under health or life insurance policies, wrongful death actions, F.EL.A.
actions, competency proceedings, etc. The importance of the medical witness is self-
evident.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 159
(1963).
3. In certain circumstances lay witnesses may also give medical testimony. For ex-
ample, any competent witness may testify about spontaneous exclamations (cries, groans,
etc.) made by an afflicted person which are relevant to proving pain or suffering. How-
ever, an analysis of such evidence is not within the scope of this note. In certain situa-
tions it may be necessary to use a physician's office records as evidence, but since their
admissibility is usually governed by the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act or
similar statutes, a discussion of the problems involved in the use of these records is not
included in this note.
4. The importance of legal liability should not be minimized, but since this note is
concerned chiefly with the admissibility of certain types of medical testimony, liability
problems have not been discussed.
5. Several writers agree that injustice results from applying the hearsay rule too
strictly to all medical testimony. See, e.g., 3 WIOMORE, EvIDENCE § 688 (3d ed. 1940);
Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstruction to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence,
10 U. CHI. L. REv. 285, 286 (1943) ; Ray, Restrictions on Doctors' Testimony in Personal
Injury Cases, 14 Sw. L.J. 133, 134 (1960); Note, 35 So. CAL. L. REV. 193, 197 (1962).
6. "History" as used in this context includes declarations of the patient about present
and past symptoms, as well as a general medical biography complete with prior ailments,
injuries, etc. A thorough medical record is not only a useful diagnostic aid, but it may
also facilitate an accurate prognosis.
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hearsay rule is applied to a medical witnes's testimony about declarations
made by the patient. Application of the rule in Missouri will be given
particular emphasis.
Patient declarations will be considered in the following categories: (1)
present conditions and symptoms; (2) past conditions and symptoms con-
nected with the injury or ailment in question; (3) general medical history
antedating the affliction for which treatment or diagnosis is sought; (4)
the cause and circumstances surrounding the onset of the injury or
disease. Generally, such evidence is offered either to prove the truth of
the facts asserted by the patient, or to show the basis7 for the doctor's opinion
about the nature and duration of the patient's injury or ailment.' Many
courts, however, have failed to distinguish the two uses. Consequently, the
hearsay rule has been imposed upon the latter as well as the former.9
I. PRBSENT SYMPTOMS
Patient declarations concerning present symptoms offered to prove the
actual existence of the symptoms are hearsay and without more are in-
admissible."0 However, statements of this type may be admitted under an
exception to the hearsay rule for bodily conditions." The rationale for
this exception is based on two general principles: necessity and circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness.' 2 Where the exception is recognized,
the statements are admitted because medical science is unable to determine
7. See Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. RMv. 473 (1962)
which states:
The function of the basis of testimony thus is primarily to support the opinion
offered. Explanation helps the physician to make his opinion clear and convincing.
It helps the trier of fact to understand the opinion, to evaluate it, and to resolve
conflicting opinion evidence (to the extent laymen ever can). Subsidiary functions
involve the facilitation of cross-examination, the facilitation of trial court and
and appellate review, and the presentation of facts upon which subsequent medical
witnesses can rely. Id. at 474. (Footnote omitted.)
8. Ray, supra note 5, at 134.
9. If hearsay is defined as a statement or assertive conduct made or occurring out of
court that is offered in court to prove the truth of the fact asserted, then, technically
speaking, testimony about any assertive statement or conduct is not hearsay unless it is
offered to prove the truth of the fact asserted. Thus, a medical expert's testimony about
patient declarations, when offered to prove the truth of the declarations, is clearly hear-
say. However, it is not hearsay when used only to show the basis of medical opinion
since its purpose is merely to establish the reliability of medical opinions and not to
prove truth.
10. Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 1940); 6 WIGmORE, Evi-
DENCE § 1715 (3d ed. 1940); see note 9 supra.
11. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 162 b (16th ed. 1899); 6 WioMoRE, EvIDENcE § 1714
(3d ed. 1940); Ray, supra note 5, at 135.
12. 6 Wioxoax, Evm-NcE §§ 1714, 1722 (3d ed. 1940); Note, 35 So. CAL. L. Rv.
193, 206 (1962).
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the existence of subjective symptoms without indications by the person ex-
periencing them, i.e., no other evidence is available. Moreover, it is as-
sumed that statements motivated by existing pain or suffering result from
a desire to be cured rather than from a motive to create evidence.
Voluntary statements by a patient which assert present subjective
symptoms must be distinguished from involuntary exclamations such as
cries, moans, grimaces, movement and other manifestations of pain or
bodily conditions. Because the latter are non-assertive, they are not hear-
say and are always (or should be) admissible as circumstantial evidence
of a bodily condition."3
In many jurisdictions the admission of patient declarations about present
symptoms is not based solely on the bodily condition exception but rather
is dependent upon the type of doctor to whom the statements were made."4
The distinction most often drawn is between an attending physician and a
nonattending physician. When this distinction is applied, an attending
physician is allowed to relate the patient's declarations as evidence of the
facts asserted in the declarations,"5 while a nonattending physician may
only base his opinion on such patient statements." However, an accurate
categorization of all the cases is not possible because many reports fail to
designate the evidentiary purpose for which the patient's statements were
offered.""
The attending-nonattending physician distinction is based upon the
principle that one who consults a doctor for treatment tells the truth be-
cause he knows that his treatment may depend upon his statements.
Therefore, the desire to be cured is considered a sufficient guarantee of
trustworthiness to allow an attending physician to rely on the patient's
statements1 8 On the other hand, statements made to a nonattending phy-
13. Ray, supra note 5, at 134; 6 WIrMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1715 (3d ed. 1940). These
indications of pain come within the strict application of the res gestaa notion which is
more fully explained in text accompanying notes 41-45 infra.
14. For a collection of cases, see Annots., 130 A.L.R. 977 (1941); 67 A.L.R. 10
(1930).
15. Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1940); McCoRMICiC,
EvmEucE §§ 266-67 (1954); 6 Wromoax, EvmEuca § 1720 (3d ed. 1940); Rheingold,
supra note 7, at 494. Even in most jurisdictions using this rule, lay witnesses may relate
assertive patient statements of existing conditions. See 6 WIomoRE, EvmENCE §§ 1719-20
(3d ed. 1940). In New York, however, only pain assertions made to a physician during
consultation are admissible. Ibid. Unfortunately, the admissibility of assertions of present
symptoms has often been justified by res gestac language which confuses the assertive
statements with non-assertive exclamations. See authorities cited notes 41-45 infra and
accompanying text.
16. McCoamsic, EvIDENcE § 267 (1954).
17. Rheingold, supra note 7, at 494 n.124.
18. Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1940); Petersen v. De-
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aician are presumed devoid of such a guarantee because the probability of
a patient making a self-serving statement increases as trial draws near."
This presumption is particularly strong when a nonattending physician is
consulted solely for the purpose of preparing expert medical testimony. It
is less relevant when a nonattending physician is consulted to give addi-
tional prescription or aid an attending doctor in diagnosis. Consequently,
a plaintiff's attorney may be precluded from using well known or so called
"super" medical experts at trial if it is necessary for such a witness to re-
late a patient's statements.2"
Although this distinction appears logical, there are arguments to the
contrary. For example, there is some measure of trustworthiness even in
the case of a nonattending doctor since he has been trained to detect lying
and malingering by patients"' and will presumably not rely on statements
he feels have been colored or exaggerated. The presumption disregards, of
course, the possibility of the attending physician giving perjured testimony.
Furthermore, if the distinction is based on the tendency of patients to
create evidence for themselves, it should be noted that the inducement to
falsify arises with the injury or illness and does not necessarily exist only
after suit has begun.22 In addition, a rule of evidence based on the assump-
tion that plaintiffs will create claims by prevarication seems unreasonable.
Jurisdictions which apply this distinction to all types of statements, for
whatever purpose the testimony is offered, represent a small minority.
Illinois, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin are the only states listed by
Professor McCormick which limit the testimony of nonattending physicians
to facts obtained by personal examination."
Missouri courts will allow any medical witness to relate and rely on a
patient's statements concerning present symptoms and conditions.2' The
partment of Labor & Indus., 36 Wash. 2d 266, 217 P.2d 607 (1950); McCoRmicK, Evi-
DENCE § 266 (1954).
19. See the collection of cases cited note 14 supra in which this reasoning is discussed.
See also Rheingold, supra note 7, at 495-96.
20. WRIGHT, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY 73 (1956); Ray, Medical Proof of
Symptoms in Personal Injury Cases, 3 J. PuB. LAw 605, 608 (1954); Rheingold, supra
note 7, at 497.
21. Stackpole v. Northern Pac. Ry., 121 Fed. 389, 394 (C.C.D. Ore. 1903); Cam-
panale v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 290 Mass. 149, 194 N.E. 831 (1935). See Edwards
v. Druien, 235 Ky. 835, 32 S.W.2d 411 (1930).
22. Cuneo Press Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 341 Ill. 569, 173 N.E. 470 (1930).
23. McCormick, Direct Examination of Medical Experts, 12 LA. L. Rzv. 264, 267
(1952). Even these jurisdictions will allow such witnesses to give opinions based on
hypothetical questions.
24. See,.e.g., Berry v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d 825
(1938).
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attending-nonattending physician distinction is not recognized.25  Nor do
Missouri cases distiguish the introduction of medical testimony as substan-
tive evidence from its introduction as the foundation of expert opinion.2
II. PAST SYMPTOMS
If a medical witness is allowed to relate any patient statements at all,
(i.e., the attending doctor in those jurisdictions using the nonattending
doctor rule) then it seems that nearly all states will allow him to base an
opinion upon past symptoms or conditions which occurred in connection
with the present injury or illness but prior to consultation.27
The Missouri rule, based solely on the distinction between past and
present symptoms, is illustrated by Gladney v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.:2"
"The dividing line between symptoms related to the doctor which may be
relied upon and those which may not be relied upon is merely the line
which divides the present from the past."29
A few jurisdictions other than Missouri prohibit reliance on past symp-
toms on the belief that there is an insufficient guarantee of trustworthiness;
it is assumed that the patient will not be motivated to tell the truth in
order to recover.3" The necessity requirement, however, is the same in
both cases since both past and present conditions may relate to subjective
symptoms for which no other evidence is available. Moreover, founding
this distinction on lack of trustworthiness is not necessarily sound logic. A
patient consulting a doctor for treatment surely is aware that an accurate
diagnosis enhances the chance for recovery and that correct diagnosis and
treatment may depend in part on past symptoms. 1 Contrary reasoning
25. See, e.g., London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1936) (attend-
ing doctor); Bennett v. Myres, 21 S.W.2d 943 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (attending doctor);
Phares v. Century Elec. Co., 131 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (non-attending
doctor). The same rule was applied to both types of physicians. But see note 39 infra.
26. See, e.g., Berry v. Kansas City Pub. Sere. Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d 825
(1938); Holloway v. Kansas City, 184 Mo. 19, 82 S.W. 89 (1904). But see Corbett
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 336 Mo. 972, 82 S.W.2d 97 (1935). The Missouri rule which
is based on the type of statement is considered in section II of the text.
27. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Baugh, 87 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1936); Cain v.
Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 252 P.2d 909 (1953).
28. 186 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945).
29. Id. at 544.
30. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Baugh, 87 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1936). Berry
v. Kansas City Pub. Sere. Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d 825 (1938). Usually the
Missouri cases do not indicate why past symptoms are not allowed but merely state
the rule. See also 3 WIGMORZ, EVMENCE § 688 (3d ed. 1940) which states that the
principle is the same for present and past symptoms.
31. The lack of trustworthiness argument does apply to nonattending doctors to
some extent, but this is no sound reason for prohibiting all doctors from relying on
past history.
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seems to disregard the purpose for which doctors and hospitals, where more
is at stake than the outcome of litigation, keep accurate medical records. 2
An Alabama court in State Realty Go. v. Ligon,"3 recognized this reliance
by medical science, by stating:
[I]n the practice of medicine, a diagnosis of the ailment may in-
clude a personal examination of the patient by all the methods known
to science, and also the history of the case, as given by the patient or
other examining physicians.
This history may include a statement of present and past symptoms,
the incidents connected with the beginning of the trouble, such as
injury by accident, and the findings of other physicians .... A pro-
fessional opinion as to the nature, cause, and extent of the ailment,
based upon all these matters in connection with and as part of the
personal examination of the patient, is competent evidence. Neces-
sarily the information coming to the physician may be largely hear-
say. An exception is made.., because the patient's statements are pre-
sumed to be made to aid a correct diagnosis and cure .... ."
The Missouri rule does not merely affect the weight to be given to an
opinion by an expert medical witness but rather controls the admissibility
of the opinion itself."5 As early as 1904, the Supreme Court of Missouri,
in Holloway v. Kansas City, " stated that the rule was "well settled" that
the opinion of an expert witness is permissible when based upon a witness's
personal knowledge, but that the patient's statements concerning past
physical condition are mere hearsay and should not be relied upon by an
expert in expressing his opinion about the patient's physical condition at
the time of trial." The rule found contemporary reaffirmance in Murphy v.
S. S. Kresge Co.,"8 in which the court allowed a medical witness to relate
and base an opinion upon patient statements about physical conditions
existing at the time of the examination, but did not permit him to relate
32. Since the use of such statements by medical science is known by anyone who
has ever consulted a doctor for treatment, it is difficult to understand why the courts
ever made a distinction between past and present symptoms. One explanation is that
past symptoms are not part of the res gestae as that term is applied by Missouri courts.
Another reason might be that courts are fearful of prejudicing the defendant.
33. 218 Ala. 541, 119 So. 672 (1929).
34. Id. at 543, 119 So. at 674. This case, with its encompassing statements, is not a
recent decision, but its reasoning may be even more sound today.
35. E.g., Holmes v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 Mo. 1178, 257 S.W.2d 922 (1953).
Even though the admission of an opinion based on past history is reversible error, a
defective admission can later be cured without the necessity of a new trial if the trial
judge instructs the jury to disregard the defective opinion. Evans v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
342 Mo. 420, 116 S.W.2d 8 (1937) (not error to refuse to grant a mistrial).
36. 184 Mo. 19, 82 S.W. 89 (1904).
37. Id. at 30-31, 82 S.W. at 91.
38. 239 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
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or base an opinion upon statements of past symptoms and conditions. The
case involved a nonattending medical witness but the prohibition was not
invoked for that reason."
While Missouri cases tenaciously hold to the rule, reasons for its con-
tinued existence are not readily discernable since most decisions have not
attempted to justify the position on grounds other than stare decisis.' One
early Missouri case, Goss v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,4 1 did analyze the problem.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, although noting that the "usual ex-
pressions" of bodily or mental feelings are original and competent evidence,
held that those expressions must relate to present and not past feeling since
they are part of the res gestae. According to the court, if the declaration
and the fact to be proved are so closely connected that the declaration can
be said to be spontaneous, then it is a verbal act and may be said to be
part of the main act. 2 The case illustrates judicial confusion between
spontaneous exclamations (cries, groans, etc.) and verbal declarations
which are assertive. If an assertive declaration is admitted as part of the
res gestae and not as a hearsay exception, then any declaration not con-
temporaneous in point of time with the actual symptom or condition is
inadmissible because it is not part of the res gestae.
In Gibler v. Quincy, 0. & K.C.R.R.,43 the St. Louis Court of Appeals
also discussed the admissibility of assertive declarations in res gestae lan-
guage. The Holloway case and Greenleaf's Treatise on Evidence were cited
as authority.44 Although Greenleaf does indeed refer to the past-present
distinction as the "correct rule,"'45 his justification is based not on the res
gestae notion but upon a definite exception to the hearsay rule. He is un-
39. Although the rule with its distinction between past and present conditions is
indeed "well settled," at least one Missouri case has applied the attending-nonattend-
ing physician rule. Coghill v. Quincy, 0. & K.C. Ry., 206 S.W. 912 (Mo. Ct. App.
1918). That case, decided by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, held that an attend-
ing doctor's testimony was admissible even though made up in part of statements
made by the patient-plaintiff to the doctor. It is interesting to note that the physician
in Coghill was classified as an attending doctor even though he did not treat the plain-
tiff until a year after the accident. In Evans v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 342 Mo. 420, 116
S.W.2d 8 (1937), the Supreme Court of Missouri intimated that there may be a dif-
ference between an attending and a nonattending doctor in regards to the admissibility
of testimony. However, since there was no specific objction about that point (the wit-
ness was a nonattending doctor) the court refused to reverse the decision.
40. See, e.g., Sparks v. Harvey, 214 S.W. 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919).
41. 50 Mo. App. 614 (1892).
42. Id. at 615.
43. 129 Mo. App. 93, 107 S.W. 1021 (1908).
44. Id. at 95, 107 S.W. at 1024
45. 1 GREENLEAP, EVI)ENCE § 162 b (16th ed. 1899).
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willing to extend the exception to statements of past conditions. In fact, he
expressly states that to admit statements of present condition under the res
gestae notion is unsound, since such statements are not actually indirect or
circumstantial evidence."
Res gestae in situations of this type should technically apply only to
spontaneous exclamations and statements produced by existing pain or
suffering, and not to later verbal assertions made in response to questions
asked by a doctor. An accurate implementation of the res gestae limitation
would require Missouri courts to reject medical testimony which relates
or relies upon any assertive patient statements made after the symptom
has ceased. Missouri courts, however, do allow a physician to relate and
rely on assertive patient statements, even those made in response to his
questions, provided they relate to "present" symptoms which include those
occurring shortly before, but not necessarily existing when, the statement is
made. Therefore, it is evident that Missouri courts, although they follow
the past-present rule which was originally justified on res gestae grounds,
have not felt bound by the logical limitations of the res gestae theory.'7
The Missouri rule, however, is not inexorable. Various methods have
been devised by which exclusion is circumvented. The most frequently
used is the hypothetical question in which the basis of the expert's opinion
is a hypothesis posed by the attorney.4" A medical expert is permitted to rely
on the "history" stated by the attorney because it is assumed to be true
for the purpose of the hypothetical." A second method is illustrated in
Rodefeld v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co."0 The trial court allowed plaintiff's
medical witness to relate the "history" of the case as given to him by the
plaintiff and to base his opinion upon this "history." Nevertheless, the
appellate court refused to reverse a judgment for the plaintiff because the
"history" was composed solely of facts not in controversy and which had
been admitted by defendant's medical witness."' Heiter v. Terminal R.R.
46. Id. at § 162 a.
47. The possibility that the rule is apt to be around even longer is indicated by the
case of Krug v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 120 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1941)
(applying Missouri law), wherein it is stated that the rule will be applied even if the
patient's declarations were made under circumstances negating any intent to fabricate
evidence. The court also said that the rule had been long established and any change
should be made by the legislature.
48. E.g., Lyons v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 253 Mo. 143, 161 S.W. 726 (1913); Franklin
v. St. Louis & M.R.R., 188 Mo. 533, 87 S.W. 930 (1905).
49. See note 61 infra and accompanying text for restrictions on the use of the hypo-
thetical question.
50. 275 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1955).
51. This refusal to reverse a judgment on the grounds that an error was com-
mitted at trial, when the error did not prejudice the non-prevailing party, also applies
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss2/3
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Ass'n 2 reached a similar result on the ground that the plaintiff had testified
previously to the same facts on which the medical witness based his opinion.
The effectiveness of these methods in modifying the rule and thus achieving
equitable results in all cases will be considered in Section V below.
III. STATEMENTS OF PAST ISTORY
Most jurisdictions, with the exception of Missouri, allow a medical wit-
ness to rely on a past history related to him by the patient unless the witness
is prohibited from repeating any type of patient statement by the nonattend-
ing physician rule.53 For example, those jurisdictions which allow an at-
tending physician to rely on patient statements concerning present or past
conditions or symptoms do not prohibit him from relying on a "history"
given by the patient even though the "history" concerns medical facts
antedating the present illness or injury.
The necessity and trustworthiness requirements, essential to the admissi-
bility of statements about past and present symptoms, have equal appli-
cation to statements of past history. The necessity requirement is always
satisfied when considering subjective symptoms. Similarly, the motive to
recover is still present since treatment may be based to some extent on the
patient's past history. Perhaps past history is not as important to a medi-
cal practitioner as symptoms of the present illness; nevertheless, physicians
attempt to obtain past history to discover or eliminate possible contributing
factors, or to ascertain how the patient will respond to treatment. This
point was discussed by a California court in People v. Brown:"'
It cannot be doubted that a physician's diagnosis as to an injury will
usually be based . . . in part upon the history given by the patient.
to other procedural and evidentiary errors, and therefore cannot be attributed solely
to a desire on the part of courts to circumvent the rule governing admissibility of
medical evidence.
52. 275 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). See also Cruce v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 361
Mo. 1138, 238 S.W.2d 674 (1951), where it was held not to be error to admit a doc-
tor's opinion, even though he stated he took a "history," when the doctor explicitly testi-
fied that he based his opinion only on his personal examination.
53. The rules applicable to past history are, generally speaking, the same as those
applied to past symptoms and conditions. Allowing declarations about past matters:
Martin v. United States, 284 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Hillman v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 56 Idaho 67, 51 P.2d 703 (1935); Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Bayette, 342 S.W.2d
379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Ynsfran v. Burkhart, 247 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952). For a collection of cases see Annots., 51 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1957); 130 A.L.R. 977
(1941); 80 A.L.R. 1527 (1932); 67 A.L.R. 10 (1930); 65 A.L.R. 1217 (1930); 64A.L.R.
557 (1929); see also 6 WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 1722 b (3d ed. 1940). Not allowing declara-
tions about past matters: Berry v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d
825 (1938); Chavaries v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 110 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App.
1937).
54. 49 Cal. 2d 577, 582, 320 P.2d 5, 10 (1958).
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And the physician should be allowed to testify to all the facts upon
which he based his opinion, including the case history given him by
the patient .... Therefore, declarations... concerning physical con-
dition prior to an accident ... and declarations as to the history of
an accident.., have been admitted as a basis for the opinion of a phy-
sician to whom the declarations were made.
As noted in the previous section, the Missouri rule prohibits a physician
from relating or relying on statements concerning past history." However,
he may testify to such matters in response to a hypothetical question 8 or by
relating or basing his opinion upon prior testimony" or upon facts not in
dispute.58
IV. STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE CAUSE AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE AFFLICTION
Although it would seem that patient statements concerning the cause
and the circumstances of an injury or ailment are as important in a
physician's diagnosis as the case history, such testimony has been generally
excluded even when offered as the basis of an opinion. " It may be declared
inadmissible by one of the rules previously mentioned (e.g., the Missouri
rule), or because it invades the province of the jury or unduly prejudices
the defendant."0 The latter reasoning becomes particularly compelling when
55. E.g., Bennett v. Myres, 21 S.W.2d 943 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (attending physi-
cian); accord, Murphy v. S. S. Kresge Co., 239 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951)
(nonattending physician); Freese v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 58 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1933) (attending physician).
56. Adams v. Carlo, 101 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937).
57. Schwinegruber v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 241 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. Ct. App.
1951).
58. Lesch v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1953).
59. E.g., Commonwealth v. Dawn, 302 Mass. 255, 19 N.E.2d 315 (1939); Pope v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 341 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1960); Huffman v. Terminal R.R.
Ass'n, 281 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. 1955); Boulanger v. McQuestin, 79 N.H. 175, 106 Atl.
492 (1919). See the cases collected in Annot., 130 A.L.R. 977 (1941).
60. Prejudicial testimony, although technically admissible for a limited purpose,
was excluded in Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933). In discussing the in-
ability of the jury to distinguish between certain types of uses, Justice Cardozo stated:
Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds. The
reverberating clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds.
It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence
are framed. They have their source very often in considerations of administrative
convenience, or practical expediency, and not in rules of logic. When the risk of
confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out.
Id. at 104.
These same policy considerations have undoubtedly influenced Missouri courts to exclude
evidence which was technically admissible. However, a frank acknowledgment of the
real reasons for exclusion, rather than illogical reliance on the hearsay rule, would do
much to clarify the law.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss2/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the testimony goes to the question of legal liability. However, a limited
number of courts have admitted this testimony as the basis for medical
opinion. Admissibility was justified on the ground that the statements
were useful in diagnosis or for other medical reasons."'
V. THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION
As was previously noted, the harsh effects of the Missouri rule may be
avoided in some instances by the use of a hypothetical question. Generally,
a hypothetical may include only "competent evidence" and is inadmissible
if phrased in a manner which enables a physician to base his opinion on
other facts. However, Missouri not only requires the hypothetical to con-
tain facts which in themselves are "competent evidence," but also requires
such facts to have been introduced into evidence. 2 For example, in Oesterle
v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co.,"3 a doctor was allowed to base his
opinion on a hypothetical which included a "history" of the case only be-
cause the "history" was "competent evidence" and had been introduced."'
Therefore, a hypothetical question only circumvents the Missouri rule
when "competent evidence" is available. However, death of the patient
may make "competent evidence" unavailable. Death of an attending phy-
sician poses a similar problem. In Meaney v. United States,"' the court was
faced with both situations. The case arose upon an appeal from a jury
verdict dismissing an action to recover for the insured's death under a
policy of war risk insurance. A second attending physician (the first
attending physician was deceased) was allowed to testify to what he
found by his own examinations, but was prohibited from relating what the
insured had told him concerning the "history" of the case. Judge Learned
Hand, reversing on the ground that the second attending doctor should
have been allowed to relate the insured's declarations as original evidence,
stated:
A man goes to his physician expecting to recount all that he feels, and
often he has with some care searched his consciousness to be sure that
he will leave out nothing. If his narrative of present symptoms is
to be received as evidence of the facts, as distinguished from mere sup-
port for the physician's opinion, these parts of it can only rest upon
61. McCoRmiox, EVIDENCE 290 (1954); 3 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 688 (3d ed.
1940).
62. E.g., Bennett v. Myres, 21 S.W.2d 943 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (hypothetical ques-
tion about the effects of arsenic was incompetent since there was no evidence that
patient had drunk arsenic).
63. 346 Mo. 321, 141 S.W.2d 780 (1940).
64. Id. at 323, 141 S.W.2d at 782.
65. 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940).
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his motive to disclose the truth because his treatment will in part
depend upon what he says....
The same reasoning applies with exactly the same force to a narra-
tive of past symptoms .... A patient has an equal motive to speak
truth; what he has felt in the past is as apt to be important in his treat-
ment as what he feels at the moment.... [I]t appears to us that if
there is to be any consistency in doctrine, either declarations of all
symptoms, present or past, should be competent, or only those which
would fall within the exception for spontaneous utterances. Nobody
would choose the second particularly as the substance of the declara-
tions can usually be got before the jury as parts of the basis on which
the physician's opinion was formed."
This case illustrates that a hypothetical question does not solve all the
problems created by the restrictive Missouri rule since the result in Meaney
would apparently have been contrary if tried under Missouri law. This
same defect is likewise inherent in the other methods by which Missouri
courts and attorneys attempt to circumvent the rule.
CONCLUSION
The Missouri rule which excludes testimony by a medical witness, even
when used as a basis for an opinion, in which he relates patient statements
of past occurrences, not only runs counter to the majority of American
jurisdictions but also disregards the realities of medical science. Missouri
courts could ameliorate this difficulty by recognizing the distinction between
patient statements offered as substantive evidence and their use to show the
basis of expert opinion. In the latter case a medical expert's testimony is
not technically hearsay and should not be subject to a hearsay objection.
If the distinction were logically applied, Missouri courts could admit pa-
tient statements solely to show the trier of fact the foundation for the medi-
cal expert's opinion and then instruct the jury to restrict their use of the
testimony to evaluating the physician's opinion, and to disregard it when
determining the truth of the facts asserted in the patient's statement.
On the other hand, when such testimony is offered as substantive evi-
dence, although it is technically hearsay, it would seem that the attending
physician rule could be applied, in the discretion of the trial judge, as a
reasonable exception to the hearsay rule.
66. Id. at 539-40.
67. Several Missouri cases have recognized that the hearsay rule is not applicable
to extrajudicial utterances offered without reference to the truth of the matter asserted.
Bond v. Wabash R.R., 363 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1962); Mash v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 341
S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1960). These cases involved extrajudicial statements used to show
state of mind or motive but their reasoning applies with equal force to evidence offered
to show the basis of a physician's opinion.
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